Differences In Cognitive Biases Research Articles

The Gut Feeling of Rational Acting: Differentiation in Cognitive Strategies Within Commercial and Recreational Sellers in Hybrid Digital Social Media Markets

In the realm of cybercrime, technologies that facilitate illicit activities also produce uncertainties based on the hybridity between digital communication and offline presence. Social media platforms have blurred the lines between types of drug sellers, bringing the recreational and the commercial into the same marketplace. In the Nordic data used in this paper, 52 text-based qualitative interviews with recreational and commercial sellers are analyzed via process and variance analysis to identify the relationship between cognitive strategies and seller positions. We ask how sellers’ decision-making processes differ and intersect. Theoretically, we use cognitive sociology to enrich understanding of culture, trust, and rational decision-making in this context. Our findings reveal that recreational sellers often adopt a low-risk, low-gain strategy rooted in cognitive biases, reflecting the recreational nature of their engagement. In contrast, commercially competent sellers employ more complex cognitive strategies, including gut feelings, thus adjusting their decisions with less reliance on initial assessments, leading to a more calculated approach with higher risk tolerance. We conclude with a discussion of intervention strategies; here, we argue for the need for a dual strategy that targets and capitalizes on the differences in cognitive biases in an effective way that poses less harm to recreational sellers.

The Impact of Cognitive Biases on Professionals' Decision-Making: A Review of Four Occupational Areas.

The author reviewed the research on the impact of cognitive biases on professionals’ decision-making in four occupational areas (management, finance, medicine, and law). Two main findings emerged. First, the literature reviewed shows that a dozen of cognitive biases has an impact on professionals’ decisions in these four areas, overconfidence being the most recurrent bias. Second, the level of evidence supporting the claim that cognitive biases impact professional decision-making differs across the areas covered. Research in finance relied primarily upon secondary data while research in medicine and law relied mainly upon primary data from vignette studies (both levels of evidence are found in management). Two research gaps are highlighted. The first one is a potential lack of ecological validity of the findings from vignette studies, which are numerous. The second is the neglect of individual differences in cognitive biases, which might lead to the false idea that all professionals are susceptible to biases, to the same extent. To address that issue, we suggest that reliable, specific measures of cognitive biases need to be improved or developed.

The Measurement of Individual Differences in Cognitive Biases: A Review and Improvement

Individual differences have been neglected in decision-making research on heuristics and cognitive biases. Addressing that issue requires having reliable measures. The author first reviewed the research on the measurement of individual differences in cognitive biases. While reliable measures of a dozen biases are currently available, our review revealed that some measures require improvement and measures of other key biases are still lacking (e.g., confirmation bias). We then conducted empirical work showing that adjustments produced a significant improvement of some measures and that confirmation bias can be reliably measured. Overall, our review and findings highlight that the measurement of individual differences in cognitive biases is still in its infancy. In particular, we suggest that contextualized (in addition to generic) measures need to be improved or developed.

Blinded by a Social Cause? Differences in Cognitive Biases between Social and Commercial Entrepreneurs

How are social entrepreneurs different from commercial entrepreneurs? This study sheds light on this issue by applying the perspective of entrepreneurial cognition and by arguing that social entrepreneurs are even more susceptible to cognitive biases than commercial entrepreneurs. The empirical study of 205 Swiss entrepreneurs could confirm that social entrepreneurs tend to be more overconfident and prone to escalation of commitment than commercial entrepreneurs, while the study found no differences for illusion of control. The findings indicate that cognitive biases are an important puzzle piece to understand the differences between social and commercial entrepreneurs.

Blinded by a Social Cause? Differences in Cognitive Biases between Social and Commercial Entrepreneurs

Blinded by a Social Cause? Differences in Cognitive Biases between Social and Commercial Entrepreneurs

Using machine learning-based analysis for behavioral differentiation between anxiety and depression

Anxiety and depression are distinct—albeit overlapping—psychiatric diseases, currently diagnosed by self-reported-symptoms. This research presents a new diagnostic methodology, which tests rigorously for differences in cognitive biases among subclinical anxious and depressed individuals. 125 participants were divided into four groups based on the levels of their anxiety and depression symptoms. A comprehensive behavioral test battery detected and quantified various cognitive–emotional biases. Advanced machine-learning tools, developed for this study, analyzed these results. These tools detect unique patterns that characterize anxiety versus depression to predict group membership. The prediction model for differentiating between symptomatic participants (i.e., high symptoms of depression, anxiety, or both) compared to the non-symptomatic control group revealed a 71.44% prediction accuracy for the former (sensitivity) and 70.78% for the latter (specificity). 68.07% and 74.18% prediction accuracy was obtained for a two-group model with high depression/anxiety, respectively. The analysis also disclosed which specific behavioral measures contributed to the prediction, pointing to key cognitive mechanisms in anxiety versus depression. These results lay the ground for improved diagnostic instruments and more effective and focused individually-based treatment.

Varying Cognitive Scars - Differential Associations Between Types of Childhood Maltreatment and Facial Emotion Processing.

BackgroundDistorted cognitive processing has been found among survivors of child maltreatment. However, different types of abuse and neglect may bring about differences in emotion and attention processing. The present study aimed to detect differential associations between various types of childhood maltreatment and attentional biases in facial emotion processing.MethodsA non-clinical sample was recruited on University campus and consisted of 67 individuals with varying degrees of maltreatment. In an evaluative conditioning task, images of faces with neutral emotional expressions were either associated with short videos of intense negative statements, or associated with neutral videos. Subsequently, these faces were used as stimuli in a face in the crowd recognition task in which the familiar faces had to be recognized within a crowd of unfamiliar neutral faces.ResultsIn multiple linear regression analyses controlling for the intercorrelatedness of types of maltreatment, differential relationships between types of maltreatment and attentional bias were found. While emotional abuse was associated with faster detection of negatively associated faces, emotional neglect was associated with an impaired recognition of familiar stimuli regardless of the emotional content.ConclusionResults indicated that interindividual differences in cognitive biases may be due to the activation of diverse cognitive schemas based on differential experiences of maltreatment.

Cultural Variation and Similarities in Cognitive Thinking Styles Versus Judgment Biases: A Review of Environmental Factors and Evolutionary Forces

Cultural psychological research has compellingly demonstrated that reliable East-West differences exist in basic cognitive styles: in contrast to the analytic, focal, linear thinking prevalent in the West, East Asians prefer to engage in more holistic, contextual, and intuitive thinking. However, despite the consensus on these cultural differences in thinking style, the literature on cross-cultural variation in actual cognitive biases is far more equivocal. The Fundamental Attribution Error (and by extension the Ultimate Attribution Error) has received the most attention among cognitive biases in the cultural arena; multiple studies have shown both evidence for cultural differences and evidence for universality. Similarly equivocal findings have emerged for other cognitive biases like the hindsight bias, positive illusions, and social exchange. Error Management Theory offers to reconcile this paradox of why consistent variation in thinking style do not necessarily lead to similarly consistent differences in cognitive biases; different mechanisms drive preferences (i.e., for how to think) versus actual behaviors (i.e., involving judgments/decisions). While different features of the physical environment likely gave rise to differences in preferences, pressures from the social environment likely pushed cognitive processing in common judgment tasks (like inferring another person’s mind or one’s own) in similar directions.

Biased cognition in East Asian and Western cultures.

The majority of cognitive bias research has been conducted in Western cultures. We examined cross-cultural differences in cognitive biases, comparing Westerners’ and East Asians’ performance and acculturation following migration to the opposite culture. Two local (UK, Hong Kong) and four migrant (short-term and long-term migrants to each culture) samples completed culturally validated tasks measuring attentional and interpretation bias. Hong Kong residents were more positively biased than people living in the UK on several measures, consistent with the lower prevalence of psychological disorders in East Asia. Migrants to the UK had reduced positive biases on some tasks, while migrants to Hong Kong were more positive, compared to their respective home counterparts, consistent with acculturation in attention and interpretation biases. These data illustrate the importance of cultural validation of findings and, if replicated, would have implications for the mental health and well-being of migrants.

“Spiritual but not religious”: Cognition, schizotypy, and conversion in alternative beliefs

The spiritual but not religious (SBNR) are a growing population in secularizing societies. Yet, we know little about the underlying psychology of this group or their belief profile. Based on an individual difference approach, we address this knowledge gap by comparing SBNR with religious and non-religious participants. In a sample of Americans (n=1013), we find that the SBNR differ from non-religious and religious participants in a number of ways. SBNR participants are more likely to hold paranormal beliefs and to have an experiential relationship to the supernatural (e.g. have mystical experiences and feelings of universal connectedness), but are similar to religious participants in their profile of cognitive biases. SBNR participants score higher on measures of schizotypy than the religious or non-religious. Reported conversions from one group (religious, SBNR, or non-religious) to another since childhood corresponds with predictable differences in cognitive biases, with dualism predicting conversion to religion and schizotypy predicting conversion to SBNR.

Bottlenose dolphins engaging in more social affiliative behaviour judge ambiguous cues more optimistically

Cognitive bias tests measure variation in emotional appraisal and are validated methods to assess animals’ affective states. However, the link between social behaviours and cognitive bias has not yet been investigated. Bottlenose dolphins are a gregarious species for whom welfare research is increasing in importance, and thus are a good model to test such an association. We adapted a spatial location judgement bias test for eight captive bottlenose dolphins to investigate the link between cognitive bias and social behaviour, where we conducted behavioural observations outside of training sessions and did not experimentally induce an affective state. Subjects showed stable individual differences in cognitive biases across the three test days. Furthermore, dolphins showing more synchronous swimming, a fundamental affiliative behaviour, judged ambiguous cues significantly more optimistically. Our longer-term data showed cognitive bias and synchronous swimming frequency were significantly associated for up to two months preceding the test, but disappeared prior to that, suggesting that here cognitive bias differences were reflected by transitory affective states rather than longer-term traits. We hypothesise that the frequency of synchronous swimming may induce affective states and/or be induced by them; either way, it has strong potential as an indicator of affective state in this species and beyond.

Testing theories of secularization and religious belief in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Several theoretical approaches have been proposed to explain variation in religiosity, including versions of secularization hypotheses, evolved cognitive biases, and cultural transmission. In this paper we test several theories that aim to explain variation in religiosity and compare them in a representative sample collected in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (N = 2022). These two countries represent a natural experiment in religiosity; despite their high level of historical, institutional and cultural similarity, their populations differ markedly in the rate of religious belief. We examine the predictive power of cognitive biases (anthropomorphism, dualism, teleology, mentalizing, and analytic thinking); institutional insecurity; and exposure to credibility displays of belief in childhood on various factors of religious belief. We find that individual differences in cognitive biases predicted 8% of the variance belief in God, but predicted 21% of the variance in paranormal beliefs and almost no variance in religious participation. Perceived institutional insecurity explains little variance in any of these variables, but cultural transmission, measured as exposure to credibility enhancing displays (CREDs) and church attendance in childhood, predicted 17% of the variance in belief in God and 30% of religious participation, and mediated 70% of the difference between these two countries in belief in God and 80% of the difference in religious practice. These findings suggest cognitive biases may explain the existence of belief in the supernatural generally, but cultural transmission through credible belief displays is a more plausible explanation for why people adopt and maintain a specific set of religious beliefs and practices.

Individual differences in cognitive biases: Evidence against one-factor theory of rationality

In this paper we seek to gain an improved understanding of the structure of cognitive biases and their relationship with measures of intelligence and relevant non-cognitive constructs. We report on the outcomes of a study based on a heterogeneous set of seven cognitive biases — anchoring effect, belief bias, overconfidence bias, hindsight bias, base rate neglect, outcome bias and sunk cost effect. New scales for the assessment of these biases were administered to 243 undergraduate students along with measures of fluid (Gf) and crystallized (Gc) intelligence, a Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), Openness/Intellect (O/I) scale and Need for Cognition (NFC) scale. The expected experimental results were confirmed — i.e., each normatively irrelevant variable significantly influenced participants' responses. Also, with the exception of hindsight bias, all cognitive biases showed satisfactory reliability estimates (αs>.70). However, correlations among the cognitive bias measures were low (rs<.20). Although exploratory factor analysis produced two factors, their robustness was doubtful. Cognitive bias measures were also relatively independent (rs<.25) from the Gf, Gc, CRT, O/I and NFC and they define separate latent factors. This pattern of results suggests that a major part of the reliable variance of cognitive bias tasks is unique, and implies that a one-factor model of rational behavior is not plausible.

Implicit motivational processes underlying smoking in american and dutch adolescents.

Introduction: Research demonstrates that cognitive biases toward drug-related stimuli are correlated with substance use. This study aimed to investigate differences in cognitive biases (i.e., approach bias, attentional bias, and memory associations) between smoking and non-smoking adolescents in the US and the Netherlands. Within the group of smokers, we examined the relative predictive value of the cognitive biases and impulsivity related constructs (including inhibition skills, working memory, and risk taking) on daily smoking and nicotine dependence.Method: A total of 125 American and Dutch adolescent smokers (n = 67) and non-smokers (n = 58) between 13 and 18 years old participated. Participants completed the smoking approach–avoidance task, the classical and emotional Stroop task, brief implicit associations task, balloon analog risk task, the self-ordering pointing task, and a questionnaire assessing level of nicotine dependence and smoking behavior.Results: The analytical sample consisted of 56 Dutch adolescents (27 smokers and 29 non-smokers) and 37 American adolescents (19 smokers and 18 non-smokers). No differences in cognitive biases between smokers and non-smokers were found. Generally, Dutch adolescents demonstrated an avoidance bias toward both smoking and neutral stimuli whereas the American adolescents did not demonstrate a bias. Within the group of smokers, regression analyses showed that stronger attentional bias and weaker inhibition skills predicted greater nicotine dependence while weak working memory predicted more daily cigarette use.Conclusion: Attentional bias, inhibition skills, and working memory might be important factors explaining smoking in adolescence. Cultural differences in approach–avoidance bias should be considered in future research.

Attentional Biases for Emotional Faces in Young Children of Mothers with Chronic or Recurrent Depression

Attentional biases for negative stimuli have been observed in school-age and adolescent children of depressed mothers and may reflect a vulnerability to depression. The direction of these biases and whether they can be identified in early childhood remains unclear. The current study examined attentional biases in 5-7-year-old children of depressed and non-depressed mothers. Following a mood induction, children participated in a dot-probe task assessing biases for sad and happy faces. There was a significant interaction of group and sex: daughters of depressed mothers attended selectively to sad faces, while children of controls and sons of depressed mothers did not exhibit biases. No effects were found for happy stimuli. These findings suggest that attentional biases are discernible in early childhood and may be vulnerability markers for depression. The results also raise the possibility that sex differences in cognitive biases are evident before the emergence of sex differences in the prevalence of depression.

Interpretive biases for one's own behavior and physiology in high-trait-anxious individuals and repressors.

The experiments reported here were designed to test predictions from a cognitive theory of personality proposed by M. W. Eysenck (1997). According to that theory, many of the observed differences between individuals high in trait anxiety and repressors (individuals low in trait anxiety and high in social desirability) depend on underlying individual differences in cognitive biases. It follows from the theory that high-anxious individuals should have an interpretive bias for their own behavior in social situations, that is, they exaggerate how anxious it is. In contrast, repressors should have an opposite interpretive bias for their own behavior, that is, they underestimate how anxious it is. Evidence consistent with these predictions was obtained in Experiments 1 and 2. Implications of these findings for cognitive theories of personality are discussed.